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Abstract
This study focuses on the utilization of high performance work systems (HPWS) by 
subsidiaries of American multinational companies (MNCs).  It is based on the premise that 
American  MNCs  have  a  preference  for  HPWS  utilization.  However, institutional 
influences at the host-country level may limit  the likelihood of HPWS implementation. 
This study examines HPWS implementation in a sample of subsidiaries across fourteen 
host countries in Asia, Africa, and Europe. The research provides considerable variability 
in host-country institutional environments. The model we propose is largely supported in 
the  case  of  rank-and-file  workers,  though  some  anomalies  are  found  in  the  case  of 
managerial employees.

The study of the diffusion of human resource management (HRM) practices across 
country  borders  has  become  increasingly  important  in  international  HRM  research 
(Brewster, 2006). Research shows that the transfer of HRM practices from multinational 
corporations (MNCs) to their foreign subsidiaries may be contingent upon the country-of-
origin of the MNC (Lau & Ngo, 2001), institutional distances between the local and parent 
country locations (Gaur, Delios, & Singh, 2007), and the institutional pressures embedded 
in the local environment (Björkman, Fey, & Park, 2007). Despite extensive evidence exists 
about the contextual factors related to the similarities or dissimilarities of MNC subsidiary 
HRM practices across country borders, it is still the case that “little is known about the 
extent to which high-performance HRM practices are found in foreign subsidiaries across 
countries” (Björkman et al., 2007: 431). 
In a similar vein, the global integration–local responsiveness (GI-LR) framework 
articulated by various scholars (e.g., Hannon, Huang, & Jaw, 1995) tends to highlight the 
determinants of the tension between MNCs’ decision to integrate  their  HRM practices 
across different countries at the corporate level or to be more responsive to local conditions 
at the subsidiary level, abiding by laws and other institutional influences. Although this GI-
LR approach examines the complexity of environmental influences on subsidiary HRM 
practices, much of the investigation has been centered on different nationalities of MNCs 
located in a single host country rather than multiple host countries (Hannon, et al., 1995; 
Ferner, Almond, and Colling, 2005; Rosenzweig and Nohria, 1994). In addition, much of 
the work has been focused on the perceived influence of  the parent  company over  its 
subsidiary (e.g., Fenton-O’Creevy, Gooderham, & Nordhaug, 2008) rather than the specific 
HRM practices being transferred. 
Another approach has taken the view from institutional theory (Björkman et al., 
2007). Björkman et al. (2007) tested the degree of utilization of high performance work 
systems (HPWSs) by MNC subsidiaries operating in the U.S., Russia and Finland. They 
found subsidiary  factors (i.e.  the status  of  the HR department  and the involvement  of 
subsidiary in knowledge transfer) influenced the use of HPWSs. Although they examined 
subsidiaries in three host countries and addressed the significance of institutional pressures 
faced by the subsidiaries, they had not directly tested specific measures of various aspects 
of  the institutional  environment  within  host  countries.   The  likely  institutional  factors 
include  the  favorableness  of  the  political-legislative  environment  to  business,  the 
restrictiveness of labor legislation, professional norms, and aspects of the cultural-cognitive 
institutional environment. Scholars have yet to “disentangle the relative influence of MNC-
internal and –external regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive processes” (Björkman et 
al.,  2007:  444) in determining the adoption of HRM practices in the diverse context of 
subsidiaries.   
Our study seeks to address the above call  by investigating the tension between 
institutional  pressures  and  the  adoption  of  HRM  practices  in  foreign  subsidiaries  of 
American MNCs operating in fourteen host countries dispersed throughout Europe, Africa, 
and Asia. We focused specifically on the extent of implementation of HPWSs, defined as 
including performance-based pay, extensive training, employee empowerment, extensive 
effort  and  care  in  recruitment  and  selection,  and  merit  as  a  basis  for  organizational 
advancement,  in  foreign  subsidiaries  of  American  MNCs  when  confronted  with  host-
country institutional challenges. Unlike previous studies examining data from only one host 
country (e.g., Hannon et al., 1995; Rosenzweig  & Nohria, 1994) or a few host countries 
2
(e.g.,  Björkman et al.,  2007), our study involves a larger and more diverse set of host 
countries.  Meanwhile, our study goes beyond the conventional perspectives that use host- 
or home-country dummy variables as proxies to represent influences from parent-country 
and  host-country  institutional  environments.  We  argue  that  countries  differ  from one 
another on a whole range of social, economic, and political characteristics. Overall, our 
work  makes  for  a  robust  and  generalizable  model  of  HPWS  utilization  in  foreign 
subsidiaries from the institutional perspective.
The Institutional Perspective
Institutional theory occupies a central role in the study of organizations (DiMaggio 
& Powell, 1991; Meyer  & Rowan, 1991; Scott, 1995).  Scott (1995) defined the “three 
pillars” of the institutional environment as the regulative, normative, and cultural-cognitive 
systems. The regulatory environment refers to “the existing laws and rules in a particular 
national environment that promote certain types of behaviors and restrict others” (Kostova, 
1999: 314).  The  normative environment represents internalized beliefs about proper and 
improper action.  Beliefs about what is right and what is wrong drive action here, even 
though these beliefs do not fully align with the decision maker’s values and desires. Failure 
to abide by normative conventions can result  in various social  sanctions,  thus possibly 
impeding the flow of crucial  resources.  The  cultural-cognitive  environment consists  of 
common and relatively resilient ways of thinking that develop among members of a society 
and that are propagated through both formal and informal social interactions.  
Institutional  theory  concerns  how  these  significant  environmental  forces  can 
promote  isomorphism  among  organizations  with  regard  to  structure  and  process. 
Institutional  theory  argues  that  isomorphism derives  from institutional  pressures  when 
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decision makers seek social legitimacy and to guarantee survival for their organizations by 
mimicking other  organizations,  conforming to  laws  and governmental  regulations,  and 
abiding by social norms.  As we are concerned with foreign subsidiaries of MNCs, we need 
to take into account the dual pressures of the home-country and host-country institutional 
environments.
Kostova and Roth (2002) examined institutional and organizational influences on 
the  transference  of  a  quality  management  program  of  an  American  MNC  to  foreign 
subsidiaries of the company.  They developed national institutional profiles for the host 
countries in their study, measuring the favorableness or unfavorableness of the of host-
country  regulatory,  normative,  and  cognitive-cultural  environments  specifically  to  the 
implementation of quality management practices in subsidiaries.  Their findings support the 
relevance of the three institutional dimensions to both the adoption and internalization of 
quality management practices by foreign subsidiaries.
In the field of international HRM, the institutional perspective has been applied 
extensively in previous studies and is seen as an important theoretical approach in this area 
(Björkman, 2006).  However,  scholars differ as to how extensively HRM practices are 
transferred to foreign subsidiaries. Rosenszwieg and Nohria (1994: 230) noted that “the 
profile  of  management  practices  in  an  MNC is  shaped  by  the  interplay  of  opposing 
pressures  for  internal  consistency  and  for  isomorphism  with  the  local  institutional 
environment,  with  specific  practices  shaped  by  these  opposing  pressures  to  varying 
degrees.”   More  recently,  Rosenszwieg  (2006)  observes  the  tensions  between  global 
integration and local responsiveness in the HRM area is still among the key determinants of 
the degree  of  HRM conformity.  Although not  all  authors  explicitly  apply  institutional 
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theory in analyzing the similarities and differences between parent company and foreign 
subsidiary  HRM  policies,  scholars  indicated  the  pressures  from  the  host-country 
environment may induce the parent company to respond to the local needs in order to gain 
legitimacy in the host environment (e.g., Hannon et al., 1995). In other words, the host-
country institutional environment is highly relevant to the utilization of HPWS practices. 
The  dependent  variable  in  previous  studies  has  often  been  restricted  to  the 
perceived autonomy of foreign subsidiaries relative to parent companies in formulating 
subsidiary  HRM practices  rather  than  specific  employment  practices  or  systems.   For 
example,  Fenton-O’Creevy  et  al.  (2008)  analyzed  subsidiary  autonomy in  determining 
HRM practices across subsidiaries of American MNCs in Australia and several European 
countries, specifically examining the role of institutional pressures.  In contrast, Ferner et 
al. (2005) utilized institutional theory (along with business systems theory) to analyze the 
transfer of diversity programs from American MNCs to British subsidiaries. They found 
conditions  under  which  subsidiaries  may  avoid  full  compliance  with  parent  company 
expectations,  leading  to  “resistive  hybridization”  or  partial  implementation  of  such 
programs at the subsidiary level, which is consistent with the Oliver’s (1991) arguments. 
Similar observations were made by Martin and Beaumont (1998).
Finally,  two  recent  studies  examined  HRM  practices  from  the  institutional 
perspective.  Gaur  et  al.  (2007)  demonstrated  the  importance  of  the  host-country 
environment  in  affecting  subsidiary  staffing  strategies.  More  broadly,  Björkman  et  al. 
(2007) argued that the prevalence of HPWS practices in foreign subsidiaries depends on 
the host-country institutional environment to some extent. At the global level (i.e., parent 
company level),  they assumed that HPWS practices were strongly institutionalized and 
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were  viewed  as  representing  “best  practices”  in  the  HR  field.   On  the  other  hand, 
institutional  influences  at  the  host-country  level  were  seen  to  vary  regarding  their 
supportiveness of the implementation of HPWS practices. 
The Utilization of High Performance Work Systems in Foreign Subsidiaries
High Performance Work Systems
The term “HPWS practices” refers to the HRM approaches that originally emerged 
in the US especially in the early 1980s (Appelbaum and Batt, 1994).  Core features of 
HPWS  practices  include  performance-based  pay,  worker  empowerment,  teamwork, 
promotions  based  on  merit  rather  than  seniority,  extensive  training,  and  very  careful 
recruitment and selection of employees (with a focus on the overall organizational fit of job 
candidates).  We examine two separate groups of employees: managers and rank-and-file 
workers.  HR systems in firms are typically not unitary (Lepak & Snell, 1999) and depend 
on a range of organizational and worker characteristics.  Earlier work by Fey and Björkman 
(2001) suggests the extent of HRM practices applied to managerial and non-managerial 
employees may be different and that may further influence firm performance in a different 
ways. They therefore suggest future research to focus on the different bundles of HRM 
practices across employee groups. Among rank-and-file workers,  we focus on full-time 
permanent workers, who are more apt to represent the core lower-level employees in the 
company.   Lepak  and  Snell  (1999)  argued  that  HPWSs  would  be  most  apt  to  be 
implemented  in  situations  where  employee  skills  are  quite  valuable  and  not  readily 
available in the external market, thus necessitating internal development, which would be 
more likely in core than peripheral employees.  The use of HPWSs is also linked to the 
extent to which a particular group of employees is seen to constitute a basis for sustained 
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competitive advantage, as discussed in the literature dealing with the resource based view 
of the firm (Wright, Dunford, & Snell, 2001).  
High Performance Work System as “Best Practice”
An important  assumption  of  our  study is  that  HPWSs are  widely  seen  among 
professional managers, at least at the parent-company level, as constituting a set of “best 
practices” in the HRM domain for the firm’s core employees.  Thus HPWS practices have 
acquired a “taken for granted” quality of institutionalized beliefs and practices.  This point 
of  view  is  consistent  with  one  of  the  basic  assumptions  of  Björkman  et  al.  (2007). 
Brewster (2006) notes the preeminence of the “universalist” perspective on HRM systems 
in  the  US  and this  case  is  also  made  by  Martin  and  Beaumont  (1998).   Ferner  and 
Quintanilla (1998) discuss the significance of “Anglo-Saxonization” as an influence on 
MNCs in general.  There is a huge body of research, mainly carried out in the US, that has 
generally found strong positive relationships between the utilization of HPWS practices 
and firm performance that supports the notion of HPWS approaches as “best practices.”  A 
recent  meta-analysis  that  used data  from 92 different  empirical  studies  concludes  that 
HPWS practices “materially affect organizational performance” (Combs, Liu, to Hall, & 
Ketchen, 2006: 515).  
Our argument here is very much consistent with the processes described by Smith 
and Meiksins (1995).  The US may be seen as a “society-in-dominance” (i.e., a society 
“deemed to represent ‘modernity’ or the future, and act…as a measure of ‘progress’ and 
‘development’” (Smith & Meiksins, 1995: 256)) which provides a model of employment 
practices that are viewed as “best practices” at the global level.  Thus there would be reason 
for  American  MNC  managers  especially  to  believe  in  the  efficacy  and  international 
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transferability of HPWS practices. Yet at the host-country level, local institutional forces 
may be at odds with this notion; host-country managers may have distinct views supported 
by local values and norms and the local regulatory environment may militate against the 
effective implementation of HPWSs (Ferner et al., 2005; Smith & Meiksins, 1995).
Host-Country Environment
Our discussion to this point indicates that the host-country environment of a foreign 
subsidiary  may be less—or more—receptive  to  HPWS implementation  than  the MNC 
home country environment, in this case the US.  In the following sections, we develop a 
series of hypotheses related to host-country institutional environment and HPWS utilization 
in  an  effort  to  understand  which  institutional  factors  might  be  the  most  important. 
However, for cross-national differences in institutional environment to have any effect, it is 
necessary that the probability of HPWS utilization differs across host countries.  If there is 
little meaningful cross-national variation, then there is little point in exploring institutional 
environments in a more focused way:
Hypothesis 1: HPWS implementation by the foreign subsidiary of American-based 
MNC will  vary across host countries in response to differences in host-country 
institutional environments.
Regulatory Institutional Influences
While the United States is an “employment-at-will” country, many other nations 
limit discharge at the employer’s discretion.  Germany has strong laws protecting unions 
and providing for works councils and codetermination, as well as job protection.  Similar 
policies, though not always as strong as Germany’s, are found in other European Union 
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(EU) countries.  In India,  lower-level  permanent employees cannot be discharged at  all 
except for cause or the failure of the company. Similar restrictions exist in Japan and were 
only abolished in Korea quite recently in the wake of the 1997 financial crisis.  Ferner et al. 
(2005) discuss the differences related to equal employment opportunities in the US and 
UK, finding that US-based workforce diversity policies cannot be so readily transferred 
directly to UK subsidiaries by American MNCs; local managers in UK subsidiaries may 
endeavor  to  limit  or  alter  the  nature  of  diversity  programs  that  they  implement.  The 
restrictiveness of laws and rules is particularly important to the recruitment and selection 
policies  under HPWSs.  American-based MNCs may need to adapt  to local  legislation, 
starting with recruitment advertisements (i.e., what can be specified in the advertisement 
based on the local legislation), recruitment sources, and recruitment strategies. 
Child and Tsai (2005: 101) suggest that companies have “an opportunity to exercise 
leadership in environmental protection and enhancement” when institutional constraints are 
low.  Correspondingly,  in  a  relatively  loose  labor  legislation  context,  American-based 
MNCs can probably play a more proactive role as a leader to introduce HPWSs into the 
host environment. Overall, restrictive regulations would be presumed to reduce the ability 
of  management  at  the  subsidiary  level  to  implement  changes  and  enforce  policies 
consistent with a HPWS:
Hypothesis  2a:  The  propensity  toward  HPWS  implementation  by  the 
foreign subsidiary of an American-based MNC will be negatively affected 
by the restrictiveness of the host country’s labor legislation.
A second component we examine under regulatory processes is “state efficiency.” 
State efficiency includes such elements as government transparency and the honesty of 
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government  officials,  along  with  the  general  openness  of  the  political  and  legal 
environments  to  business  and competitiveness.   Yiu  and Makino (2002)  use a  similar 
concept to argue that strong and formal government in the host country reduces the risk and 
uncertainty of business operations.  Oxley and Yeung (2001) found that the rule of law is 
an important predictor, for example, of e-commerce readiness across borders. Firms are 
often attracted to a country in part because of sound political institutions. Governmental 
efficiency is  generally conducive to investment  in a country by foreign firms (Clague, 
1997).   For  example,  if  the  host-country  legal  system  and  government  agencies  are 
incomplete and corrupt, risks would consequently increase and we might anticipate that a 
subsidiary would respond by imposing more control on most aspects of the organization, 
including employment relations.  The firm would presumably want to insulate itself from 
the uncertainties of the external business environment.  The opposite would be expected to 
occur where state efficiency is relatively high.  This would suggest a positive relationship 
between HPWS implementation  propensity  and state  efficiency.   There is,  however,  a 
persuasive counter-argument.  
Consider the findings in the Björkman et al. (2007) paper. What is perhaps most 
surprising is that they found that foreign subsidiaries operating in Russia made greater use 
of  HPWS  practices  than  foreign  subsidiaries  operating  in  the  US.   This  seems 
counterintuitive.  Russia generally scores lower on many of the state efficiency measures 
than many more developed economies (see World Competitiveness Yearbook 2004).  From 
our initial argument, we would anticipate that subsidiaries in Russia would be less apt to 
implement HPWSs.  Björkman et al. (2007) justify their hypotheses regarding US-Russian 
differences  by  arguing  specifically  that  the  deinstitutionalization  of  the  Soviet-era 
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personnel system left a vacuum in employment management in Russia.  They argued that 
these deficits  would give rise  to a host-country institutional environment supportive of 
HPWSs because of major deficits in the extant labor systems.  But there may be a more 
general argument that could be applied here that would extend beyond Russia (as well as 
other transitional economies).  
When MNCs enter economies of low state efficiency, they face unclear regulatory 
frameworks, unresponsive bureaucracies, and corruption that impede their ability to fully 
integrate into the local market.  While these conditions may discourage firms from entering 
such  markets  to  begin  with,  once  committed  the  firm  may  need  intraorganizational 
mechanisms  to  help  cope  with  significant  uncertainties.   HPWSs  may  be  such  a 
mechanism,  as  HPWSs  are  designed  to  facilitate  organizations  handling  significant 
environmental turbulence and uncertainty.  Employees may necessarily become important 
sources of value creation, as suggested by the resource based view of the firm applied to 
HR (Wright, et al., 2001).  Firms would need to be quite careful as to who they hire in such 
circumstances, they would need to provide considerable internal training and development, 
they would need to have more autonomous employees in order to respond to ambiguity, 
and they would need a reward system to help ensure that the actions of more autonomous 
employees  are  in  line  with  organizational  objectives.   Following  Smith  and Meiksins 
(1995), host-country managers in these sorts of environments may be searching for viable 
HR system and be prepared to emulate and even, as in the Russian case, go beyond the 
dominant  “best  practices”  model.   So  we are  able  to  move from a specific  argument 
concerning HR systems in Russia to a more general proposition: 
11
Hypothesis  2b:  The  propensity  toward  HPWS  implementation  by  the 
foreign subsidiary of an American-based MNC will be negatively affected 
by state efficiency in the host country.
Normative Institutional Influences
The institutional literature emphasizes professional training and the transmission of 
professional standards of conduct as a principal mechanism in the propagation of normative 
controls through organizations and groups of related organizations (Scott, 1995).  Much of 
the professional HR training and education that occurs around the world is rooted in the 
standard American curriculum.  The ratio of HR professionals in an affiliate serves as an 
indicator of the level of professionalization of the HR function within the affiliate.  As the 
relative number of HR professionals increases within a subsidiary, there is apt to be greater 
knowledge of, willingness to use, and greater interest in promoting what are widely viewed 
as HR “best practices,” including use of various HPWS practices.  A greater proportion of 
HR professionals should also serve to facilitate more effective HPWS implementation:
Hypothesis  3a:  The  propensity  toward  HPWS  implementation  by  the 
foreign subsidiary of an American-based MNC will be positively affected by  
the ratio of HR professionals to total employees in the subsidiary.
Labor union involvement in a subsidiary is another institutional force that could 
affect  beliefs  and norms  within  a  subsidiary.   In  general,  we would  expect  unions  to 
promote policies  that  support  employment  stability  and more  egalitarian  compensation 
practices.  Unions are often suspicious of merit-based employment systems and support 
employment practices that allocate opportunities and rewards based on seniority.  A union 
presence might also be indicative of a greater likelihood of conflict if the affiliate pursues 
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HPWS implementation, thus precluding or undermining effective HPWS implementation. 
And a  greater  union  presence  in  the  workplace  may  decrease  the  propensity  of  local 
managers to regard HPWSs as beneficial  to the company (given normative beliefs that 
could be propagated by union members and officials).  Fenton-O’Creevy et al. (2008) also 
found  that  unionization  strongly  promoted  local  autonomy  in  subsidiary  HR  system 
development:
Hypothesis 3b: The propensity for HPWS implementation by the subsidiary 
of an American-based MNC will be negatively affect by the ratio of union 
members to total employees in the subsidiary.
Finally, expatriate employees from a parent company’s home country may serve as 
conduits for enhancing and expanding HPWS practices in foreign subsidiaries.  If pressures 
for HPWS adoption are coming to a large extent from the American parent company, then 
the greater the proportion of American expatriates working in the affiliate, the more likely 
normative expectations will evolve in the affiliate favoring HPWS practices.  Björkman et 
al.  (2007)  found  certain  HPWS  practices  within  foreign  subsidiaries  to  be  positively 
influenced by the degree to which expatriates were present in the subsidiary: 
Hypothesis 3c: The propensity for HPWS implementation by the subsidiary  
of  an  American-based  MNC  will  be  positively  affected  by  the  ratio  of  
expatriate employees to total employees in the subsidiary.
Cultural-Cognitive Institutional Influences
Cultural-cognitive influences are often taken to refer to mimetic forces within the 
society promoting organizational isomorphism.  Imitation is  one mechanism leading to 
isomorphism.  However, there are other aspects of what Scott (1995) terms the cognitive-
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cultural pillar in institutional theory.  This dimension is reflected in what Scott identifies as 
its basic indicators: common beliefs and shared logics of action.  He also points to societal 
culture as providing legitimacy for action driven by mimetic behavior.  Cultural-cognitive 
influences provide common thought patterns within a group that support particular ways of 
viewing  and understanding  the  world.   Thus  common cognitive  schemas  give  rise  to 
common ways of social interaction.
Scott’s  (1995)  view  of  culture  as  a  foundation  of  a  society’s  institutional 
environment is complemented by the work of cross-cultural psychologists (Triandis, 1994; 
Hofstede, 1980).  However, there is significant debate in the management and HRM fields 
among those who argue there are important and persistent differences in HRM practices 
and organizational  structures across countries (Brewster,  2006).   One group posits that 
these variations primarily result from cross-cultural differences, while others focus on more 
readily observable social structures, such as a country’s archetypal business system.  Some 
scholars are quite critical of the culturalist perspective in this field (Ferner et al., 2005) 
while others (e.g., Brewster, 2006; Wu, Lawler, & Yi, in press) have specifically addressed 
these concerns and support cultural influences as part of an institutional framework.  
We focus on two cultural dimensions adapted from the GLOBE project (House, 
Hanges, Javidan, Dorfman, & Gupta, 2004)—power distance and performance orientation
—which are embedded in the host-country environments and are likely to influence HPWS 
implementation.  Some institutionalist studies have used the Euclidean distance between of 
the home-country and host-country cultural profiles as a cultural distance measure (e.g., 
Yiu & Makino, 2002).  This makes sense when the issue is the uncertainty that might result 
as a consequence only of degree of difference between host and home countries.   We 
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believe that the direction any cultural difference will matter in conditioning the openness of 
a host country to HPWS implementation.  Therefore, we use the actual value of cultural 
measures as independent variables here (the difference between home and host countries 
would be unnecessary to calculate as there is only one home country (US) in this study). 
Hofstede (1980) identified power distance as a cultural dimension that refers to the 
degree  members  of  a  society legitimize  social  hierarchy and entrenched differences  in 
power relationships. We argue that power distance is relevant to HPWS implementation 
because a defining feature of HPWSs is increased employee autonomy and empowerment. 
In high power-distance cultures, managers would very much resist relinquishing authority 
and lower  level  workers  would  feel  uncomfortable  accepting more responsibility,  thus 
having to become less deferential to those viewed as socially superior.  Previous studies 
have  demonstrated  that  empowerment  has  a  stronger  effect  on job satisfaction  in  low 
power-distance cultures such as Canada than in high power-distance cultures such as China 
(Hui, Au, & Fock, 2004) and suggest empowerment maybe incompatible with high power-
distance nations. Low power-distance cultures are more egalitarian and more receptive to 
power sharing (Kirkman & Shapiro, 1997).  House et al. (2004) noted that in high power-
distance cultures, workers tend to rely on their supervisors to make work-related decisions. 
As a result, it is more difficult to apply effectively egalitarian power-sharing practices in 
such workforces:
Hypothesis 4a: The propensity for HPWS implementation by the subsidiary 
of an American-based MNC will be negatively affected by power distance 
values prevalent in the host-country.
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Another cultural dimension that we consider is performance orientation (House et 
al.,  2004),  defined as the extent to which a society encourages and rewards people for 
performance improvement and excellence.  Since high performance work systems reward 
employees based on merit and performance, this cultural dimension could be important in 
successfully  implementing  HPWS  across  different  host  countries.  In  a  society  where 
performance orientation is high, the workforces are more likely to abide by the HPWS 
practices and to be motivated by such an achievement driven system:
Hypothesis 4b: The propensity for HPWS implementation by the subsidiary 
of  an  American-based  MNC will  be  positively  affected  by  performance  
orientation values prevalent in the host-country.
Research Methods
Sampling Procedures
Our empirical  analysis utilized both survey and archival data.  The survey data 
came  from questionnaires  given  to  both  a  senior  HR manager  and  a  senior  business 
manager in a sample of foreign subsidiaries of American MNCs.  Surveys were conducted 
by  local  collaborators  in  the  host  countries,  who  distributed  and  collected  the 
questionnaires.  Responses were obtained from a total of 234 subsidiaries in the fourteen 
host countries distributed across six geographical regions (Table 1). These countries are 
quite  diverse  in  terms  of  cultures,  institutional  systems,  and  levels  of  economic 
development.   Our  principal  sampling  frame  in  this  study  was  the  set  of  S&P  100 
companies.  For each country in our sample, we randomly selected a set of companies 
drawn from the S&P list.  We then identified any subsidiaries of that company by reference 
to the  Directory of American Firms Operating in Foreign Countries (2003), which lists 
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most foreign subsidiaries of American MNCs.  If more than one subsidiary for a particular 
MNC existed in the country, we randomly chose one of them.
Insert Table 1 Here.
We planned  to  survey  around  twenty  subsidiaries  in  each  country.   However, 
response rates varied considerably by country.  In general, our response rates were quite 
high in Asia and Africa.  Except for Japan, Vietnam, South Africa, our response rates were 
50% or higher in the Asian and African countries.  Responses rates were lower (around 
20%) in the other Asian and African countries.  Most difficult was obtaining data from 
subsidiaries operating in Europe, where our response rate was typically around only 10%.
Data Collection
One questionnaire in each subsidiary was completed by the subsidiary’s senior HR 
manager and focused on some general characteristics of the subsidiary’s workforce, along 
with a range of different HR practices.  These questions were based on similar items tested 
and validity by Bae, Chen, and Lawler (1998).  The second survey was completed by a 
senior business manager in the subsidiary and included questions dealing with subsidiary 
characteristics, business strategy, information flows, etc.  Data on HPWS practices focused 
on  two  separate  groups  of  employees:  middle  and  upper  managers  and  rank-and-file 
workers.  There were separate sections dealing with training and development, staffing, 
compensation, and workplace empowerment.
Dependent Variables
There have been several  approaches employed in  operationalizing HR strategy, 
including factor analysis, the ex ante definition of strategy typologies, and cluster analysis. 
The  first  two methods  seem to  be  more  popular  and  widely  used.   However,  Guest, 
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Conway,  and  Dewe  (2004)  maintain  that  cluster  analysis  is  perhaps  best  suited  to 
identifying HR strategies,  especially as these are defined as bundles of complementary 
HRM practices.  Therefore, the dependent variables in this study are the use of HPWSs 
within such subsidiaries developed with the help of cluster analysis.  Separate analyses 
were done for rank-and-file workers and managers.
We clustered items from the HR manager  questionnaire  designed to  assess  the 
extent of utilization of a range of HPWS practices within the subsidiary (i.e., “Practice X is 
used extensively in your subsidiary.”).  The specific items we used, all pre-coded with five-
point  Likert  response categories  (1 = “strongly disagree” to 5 = “strongly agree”),  are 
provided in Tables 4 and 5 in the results section.  The items were scored for the cluster 
analysis  so that  higher values  were more consistent  with a  HPWS.  Some items were 
reverse coded, as noted in these tables.  Each set of items (those for managers and those for 
rank-and-file workers) was used in separate cluster analyses to classify the employment 
system for each employee group. 
We utilized  two  step  cluster  analysis  (Zhang,  Ramakrishnon,  & Livny,  1996). 
Unlike  other  clustering  techniques,  this  method  works  with  multi-categorical,  ordinal 
items, as used in our survey.  Also, there are methods within two step cluster analysis that 
allow a relatively objective way of defining the number of clusters in a set of cases.  The 
approach we used is based on the Akaike coefficient.  In two step clustering, the Akaike 
coefficient is an increasing function of the internal heterogeneity of the clusters and the 
total number of clusters, as described by Zhang, et al. (1996).  Increasing the number of 
clusters leads to higher levels of cluster internal heterogeneity, but at the cost of a less 
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parsimonious solution (i.e., as there are more clusters).  The optimal solution is the number 
of clusters that minimizes the Akaike coefficient.
Independent Variables
There  are  two  variables  in  our  study  related  to  the  host-country  regulatory 
environment: restrictiveness of labor legislation and state efficiency.  The state efficiency 
variable (Hypothesis 2b) was a summated scale composed of five items taken from the 
World Competitiveness Yearbook (WCY) for the host countries in the study for 2004 (the 
year of the survey).  These items are similar to ones used by Yiu and Makino (2002). 
Specific items, scored on a ten-point scale, included “the host-country legal framework 
encourages  the  competitiveness  of  enterprises,”  “the  adaptability  of  host-country 
government policy to changes in the economy is high,” “the transparency of host-country 
government policy is satisfactory,” “the host-country bureaucracy does not hinder business 
activity,” and “bribing and corruption do not exist in the host-country economy.”  The 
alpha coefficient for the state efficiency variable for the countries used in this study was .
89.  The  restrictiveness  of  the  host-country  labor  legislation  (Hypothesis  2a)  was  a 
summated rating scale composed of four items taken from the WCY.  These items measure 
the difficulty of hiring in the host country, the difficulty of firing in the host country, the 
rigidity of hiring, and the rigidity of firing.  The alpha coefficient for the state efficiency 
variable for the countries used in this study was .79.  
The  independent  variables  used  to  measure  normative  influences  (Hypothesis 
3a-3c)  included  the  percent  of  the  subsidiary’s  workforce  belonging  to  a  union,  the 
proportion of HR professionals relative to total employment within the subsidiary, and the 
proportion  of  expatriate  employees  relative  to  total  employment  within  the subsidiary. 
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Finally, we used national culture scales developed by House et al. (2004) as measures of 
host-county cultural-cognitive influences.  We used two of these scales that were measured 
at the host-country level: performance orientation and power distance (for Hypotheses 4a 
and 4b).  House et al. (2004) created two different scales for each cultural dimension; one 
set of questions focused on values (the way respondents felt things should be done in their 
society) and the other set focused on the way respondents perceived things in actuality.  We 
used  the  second  form of  these  two  scales  both  for  power  distance  and  performance 
orientation.  This form of the scale gets more directly at the behavioral propensities of 
members of the society and is more closely related to the cognitive-cultural dimension as 
described by Scott (1995).
The  host-country  specific  values  for  the  two  regulatory  variables  and the  two 
cultural variables discussed in this section are presented in Table  1.  In some cases the 
values are missing.  We used mean substitution to impute missing values.  We recognize 
the limitations of this approach, especially for these key variables, which are not randomly 
missing.  We discuss an alternative way of handling this problem below.
Control Variables
We included  several  control  variables  in  the  analysis.   One  of  these  was  the 
logarithm of the number of employees in the subsidiary as a measure of organizational size. 
Although they used a somewhat different measure of subsidiary size than we do, Björkman 
et al. (2007) argued subsidiary size is a proxy for the importance of a subsidiary and the 
more important the subsidiary, the more likely the parent company would exercise control 
over  the  firm (thus  increasing  the probability  of  HPWS utilization).   Another  control 
variable was the logarithm of the subsidiary’s years in operation in the host country.  We 
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felt  that  more newly established subsidiaries  might have higher probabilities  of HPWS 
utilization as HPWS practices are a relatively recent development and older organizations 
would be more apt to have legacy HR systems that might be difficult to change (thus we 
expected  a  negative  relations  between  subsidiary  age  and  the  probability  of  HPWS 
utilization).  A second structural feature of the subsidiary relating to the issue of a legacy 
HR system is whether or not the subsidiary was a “greenfield” site.  If so, the MNC parent 
company would have more flexibility in adapting the subsidiary HR system to a HPWS 
standard.   Greenfield site  is  measured by dummy variable  (which was expected to be 
positively related to the probability of HPWS utilization).  
The strategic  orientation of the company (cost  leader vs.  differentiator)  is  often 
argued in the literature to be related to HPWS utilization (Chen, Lawler, and Bae, 2005). 
That is, HPWSs are seen to complement use of a differentiation strategy as it requires more 
flexibility to respond to the uncertainty of customer demands.   We asked the business 
managers two questions regarding business strategy at the subsidiary level (importance of 
“differentiating  our  products  or  services  from  competitors  based  on  quality”  and 
importance of  “providing customers  with a  variety  of  different  products  or  services”). 
These measures, which were Likert-type items, had an alpha coefficient of .57. This value 
is somewhat lower that what is normally considered an acceptable alpha level, but we still 
retained this variable in the model; we feel it is conceptually quite important and, as our 
study is largely exploratory this lower value would be considered more acceptable. 
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Knowledge exchange from and to subsidiaries was included as a control variable. 
The information  for  this  scale  was  obtained from the business  manager  questionnaire. 
Unlike Björkman et al. (2007), we had two separate Likert scales.  Information inflow was 
measured  as  the  as  the  sum  of  four  items  (strongly  agree  to  strongly  disagree)  that 
measured the flow of knowledge in different areas (technology, marketing, etc.) into the 
subsidiary from other subsidiaries and from the parent company (alpha = .75).  Information 
outflow was measured in a similar way, but focused on the flow of information from the 
subsidiary to other subsidiaries and the parent company (alpha = .86).  Finally there were 
several dummy variables included to control for the major industrial groups in the sample: 
information  technology,  services,  banking,  electronics,  and  heavy  manufacturing. 
Descriptive statistics for all independent and control variables in the analysis are presented 
in Table 2 and the correlation matrix for these variables is given Table 3.
Insert Tables 2 & 3 Here.
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Results
Clusters Analysis 
Rank-and-File  Workers.  Applying the Akaike  coefficient  criterion  to  the set  of 
items related to HPWS practices for rank-and-file workers, we extracted three meaningful 
clusters.  After the exclusion of outliers, there were 214 cases in this analysis.  Here we 
report within-cluster median values (since each item is measured on an ordinal scale) and 
the chi-square values for the cross-tabulation of each item with cluster membership (Table 
4).   All  of  the cross-tabulations were statistically  significant,  indicating that  there was 
meaningful variation in the frequency distributions of responses across cluster membership 
for all of the HR policies and practices used.  We considered the average values of the 
medians for each cluster as at least a heuristic device for interpreting the clusters.  Further 
understanding of the differences among the clusters is gained by examining the pattern of 
median values for HR policies and practices in the different clusters in order to determine 
where the clusters are similar and where they are different.
Table 4 Here
The average median for Cluster RF-A was 2.71, indicating the scores for the HR 
policies and practices within this cluster tended to be in the lower-middle end of the HPWS 
practices scales we used.  Lower in value than the medians for the other two clusters, this 
indicates that the cluster is not strongly consistent with a high performance work system. 
The midpoint of each item was 3.0, so RF-A has an average median value slightly below 
the mean (and thus slightly outside HPWS territory).  Cluster RF-C and Cluster RF-B had 
higher average medians, with Cluster RF-C having an average of 4.1 and Cluster RF-B 
having an average of 3.57.  Based on these numbers, Cluster RF-C would clearly fall in the 
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HPWS category, with Cluster RF-B a borderline HPWS.  The three clusters then can be 
ranked with regard to HPWS consistency, from Cluster RF-A (non-HPWS) to Cluster RF-
B (nascent HPWS) to Cluster RF-C (HPWS).
Managers. Applying the Akaike coefficient criterion to the set of items relating to 
HR policies and practices for managers, we extracted two meaningful clusters in the case 
of managerial  employees.  After the exclusion of outliers,  there were 206 cases in this 
analysis.  As with the rank-and-file clusters, each of the HR policies and practices was 
cross-tabulated with cluster membership.  Within cluster medians and the cross-tabulation 
chi-square values are reported in Table 5.
Table 5 Here
Two different clusters of approximately equal size resulted from this analysis.  Both 
clusters had average medians above the scale midpoint (3.0), with Cluster M-B having 
generally higher median values than Cluster M-A (4.22 versus 3.61).  This difference is 
somewhat similar to the relationship of Cluster RF-C to Cluster RF-B, with M-A in this 
case  being more of  a  nascent  HPWS and Cluster  M-B being relatively  more strongly 
situated at the upper (HPWS) end of the set of response categories.  In general, however, it 
appears that there is less range in HR system design in the case of managerial employees 
than in the case of rank-and-file workers.
Evaluation of Hypotheses
To evaluate Hypothesis 1, we cross-tabulated the two cluster membership variables 
with host country (Tables 6 and 7).  Each row of this table shows the proportion of cases 
within the corresponding host country that fall within each of the clusters.  The results of a 
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chi-squared analysis indicated strong relationships between host country and the clusters 
generated for rank-and-file workers (chi-square(26) = 102.33, p < .001) and for managers 
(chi-square(13) = 36.51, p < .001).  This suggests that conditions at the host-country level 
likely could matter a great deal in influencing HPWS utilization within subsidiaries.  
Insert Tables 6 & 7 Here.
Rank-and-File  Workers.   As  the  dependent  variables  in  this  study  are  ordinal 
variables, we used logit analysis to estimate the parameters of our model (Table 8).  There 
are three clusters in the case of rank-and-file workers and these can be rank ordered in 
terms of the degree to which they represent HPWSs (with RF-A at the lower end of the 
scale, RF-B in the middle, and RF-C at the higher end of the scale).  We used ordered logit 
to estimate and evaluate this model (Greene, 2007).  This procedure as used here involves 
estimating a  set  of  parameters  that  relate  the variables  in  the model  to  an  underlying 
propensity of the subsidiary to utilize HPWSs.  A positive coefficient for a given variable 
indicates that the propensity of the subsidiary toward use of HPWSs in the case of rank-
and-file workers increases with the value of the variable; a negative coefficient indicates a 
negative  relationship  between  the  variable  and  the  subsidiary’s  propensity  to  utilize 
HPWSs in the case of rank-and-file workers.  
Insert Table 8 Here.
None  of  the  industry  dummy  variables  had  a  significant  impact  on  HPWS 
propensity.   Knowledge  inflow  was  statistically  significant  at  the  .10  level  and  the 
coefficient was negative in value, indicating the situations characterized by greater levels of 
knowledge  movement  from  the  parent  company  or  other  subsidiaries  reduce  HPWS 
propensity.   This  seems  reasonable  as  the  parent  company  is  providing  considerable 
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structure to the foreign subsidiary under those circumstances; it would presumably wish to 
ensure some level of control over the subsidiary perhaps in the form of less subsidiary 
flexibility.  Perhaps less ambiguous is the impact of the subsidiary’s use of a differentiation 
business strategy, which was positive and significant at the .01 level.  The effect is very 
much as was expected.  The same holds true in the case of the number of employees in the 
subsidiary.  None of the other control variables was statistically significant in this equation.
Turning to our specific hypotheses, labor law restrictiveness was negative in sign 
(as expected), but not statistically significant.  Consequently, Hypothesis 2a is rejected in 
the case of HPWS propensity for rank-and-file workers.  In contrast, state efficiency was 
negative in sign and statistically significant at the .01 level, thus supporting Hypothesis 2b 
in the case of rank-and-file workers.  In regard to the normative institutional influences, 
there is strong support for Hypothesis 3a in the case of rank-and-file workers given the 
positive and statistically significant (p < .01) coefficient associated with the percent of HR 
professionals  in  the subsidiary.    And subsidiary unionization  rate had a negative and 
statistically significant (p < .10) effect, which is consistent with Hypothesis 3b as relates to 
rank-and-file  workers.   Although the  sign  of  the  percent  of  expatriate  employees  was 
positive, the coefficient is not statistically significant, thus failing to support Hypothesis 3c 
in the case of rank-and-file workers. Finally in regard to rank-and-file workers, Hypothesis 
4a was not supported, as power distance had a statistically insignificant effect (although it 
is negative as expected).  On the other hand Hypothesis 4b was supported by the positive 
impact of performance orientation (p < .01).
Managers.  Since there are only two clusters in the case of managers, we could have 
estimated the model using binary logit.  However, we used the ordered logit approach for 
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consistency. Although the results for rank-and-file workers were generally consistent with 
theoretical  expectations,  the  results  for  managers  deviated  substantially  from what  we 
hypothesized.  As for the controls, There was one industry effects in the case of service 
companies,  which  had  a  lower  HPWS propensity  than  the  other  industrial  categories. 
Neither of the knowledge flow variables was significant, although the organizational size 
and subsidiary use of a differentiator business strategy were both positive and significant at 
the .05  level.   These  findings  are  compatible  with  the findings  rank-and-file  workers. 
Unlike the results for rank-and-file workers, subsidiary age was significant (p < .05) and 
positive.  We had thought age would be more apt to have a negative relationship with 
HPWS propensity, so this finding was unexpected.  
Only two of the independent variables associated with principal hypotheses were 
significant.   The  unionization  rate  was  negative  and  significant  (p  <  .10),  which  is 
supportive of Hypothesis 3b and consistent with our findings for rank-and-file workers. 
However, the effect for performance orientation was negative (contrary to Hypothesis 4b), 
though statistically significant (p < .01).
Discussion
Apart  from  work  by  Björkman  et  al.  (2007),  there  are  few  studies  dealing 
specifically with the transference of HPWS practices to foreign subsidiaries.  No existing 
research on this topic has focused on more than one or two host countries.  Many of the 
studies that do exist in this field are case analyses set in a single host country.  These 
studies  provide  important  insights  concerning  the  specific  mechanics  by  which  the 
transference of HRM practices are effected.  However, they are not so useful in assessing 
the applicability of a given framework across a wide range of contexts.
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Our model focused primarily on the impact of regulatory, normative, and cultural-
cognitive institutional influences on HPWS utilization in a larger number of host countries. 
These factors were measured at the host-country and subsidiary levels and our concern was 
whether  or  not  these  factors  impacted  HPWS  utilization,  serving  to  foil  isomorphic 
pressures  favoring  HPWS  utilization  presumed  to  emanate  at  the  American  parent-
company level.  The results for the rank-and-file workers were relatively consistent with 
theoretical  expectations.   Our  hypothesis  regarding state  efficiency,  which might  seem 
counter-intuitive, was motivated in part by findings in the Björkman et al. (2007) study 
regarding differences in use of HPWS practices in the US versus Russia as MNC host 
countries.  Utilization of HPWS practices was greater in the case of Russia.  The impact of 
the state efficiency measure seems to indicate that this effect is more widespread in the 
case rank-and-file workers.  We maintain that this is related in part to a more turbulent and 
unpredictable  legal-political  environment  for  businesses  in  low  state  efficiency  host 
countries. 
The results of our analysis of HPWS utilization in the case of managers were more 
disappointing in that the proposed model was not well supported.  One possible explanation 
is that managers, likely viewed as a more significant group by the parent company, would 
be subject to more concern at the parent company level and thus the parent company would 
take  a  more  active  role  in  HR system design.   This  could  result  in  less  HR system 
variability and more reliance on HPWSs.  In fact, the results of the cluster analysis were 
skewed more in the direction of HPWSs for managers than for rank-and-file workers.  This 
suggests  perhaps  a  completely  different  model  could  be  appropriate  for  managerial 
employees, a model that incorporated more in the way of parent company characteristics, if 
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it is at the parent-company level that these decisions are more likely to occur.  However, 
we did find considerable  cross-country variation in manager  HPWS utilization,  so this 
suggests a need still to focus on host-country characteristics for managers, including other 
possible institutional influences and perhaps more in the way of host-country labor and 
product  market  conditions.   One  interesting  finding  is  that  host-country  performance 
orientation was negatively related to HPWS propensity in the case of managers, which is 
opposite  the  effect  found in  the  case  of  rank-and-file  workers.   Perhaps  performance 
orientation  does  work  very  differently  in  these  two  situations.   In  high  performance 
orientation cultures, it would seem to be easier to implement HPWSs in the case of rank-
and-file workers given their motivational orientation.  This could mean that companies 
delegate more discretion to lower level workers and the design of the employment systems 
for managers is not as important.  In contrast,  in low performance orientation cultures 
managers may need to take more initiative and certainly rank-and-file workers would have 
less discretion, leading to larger concentration of HPWS practices in the case of managerial 
HR systems in such settings.
As  with  any study,  there  are  limitations  here.   We have  made a  fairly  strong 
assumption regarding a prevalent view of HPWSs as “best practices” in American MNCs. 
Further refinement of this model might include incorporating measures that in some way 
control for the variability in these beliefs that might occur at the parent company level.  We 
mentioned missing data issues earlier.  While we used imputed values for missing values 
we also did analysis, not reported here, on the subset of cases that had values on all of the 
major independent variables.  This reduced the sample size substantially.  However, the 
results for institutional measures, especially the regulatory and cultural-cognitive measures, 
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were similar to what we obtained in the larger sample with imputed values.  So we do not 
think the missing cases problem is a serious limitation.
The set of institutional variables we have used is partial and future studies might 
work  on  expanding  this  set,  or  perhaps  looking  at  completely  different  institutional 
variables (especially in the case of managers).  Of course, more attention should be paid to 
the differences in processes related to HPWS implementation for rank-and-file workers vs. 
managers as our results for the latter group were not very strong.  As in other multi-country 
studies (e.g., Fenton-O’Creevy, 2008; Kostova & Roth, 2002), there was variability in the 
representativeness of host countries in our study which resulted from variations in response 
rates,  which is  a limitation of this study.   Future research on this topic  might also be 
concerned  with  expanding the  number  of  MNC home countries  in  order  to  see  what 
variations in HPWS utilization may occur as a function of country-of-origin. 
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Table 1
Regulatory and Cognitive-Cultural Measures by Host Country
Host Country Cases
State 
Efficiency
Restrictive 
Labor 
Legislation 
Power 
Distance
Performance 
Orientation
     East Asia
China 18 3.54 30.25 5.04 4.45
Korea 43 4.00 33.75 5.61 4.55
Japan 12 4.14 24.25 5.11 4.22
Taiwan 28 4.98 50.25 5.18 4.56
Southeast Asia
Vietnam 11 missing 55.25 5.04 4.45
Thailand 18 4.75 42.25 5.63 3.93
Singapore 26 7.84 1.00 4.99 4.90
South Asia
India 18 3.69 47.75 5.47 4.25
Africa
Kenya 17 missing 24.00 4.11 4.66 
South Africa 9 4.00 52.00 4.64 4.39
Western Europe
Italy 10 2.70 50.25 5.43 3.58
Germany 9 3.66 54.75 5.25 4.25
Eastern Europe
Romania 9 2.61 missing missing missing
Russia 6 1.90 26.75 5.52 3.39
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Table 2
Descriptive Statistic for Independent and Control Variables
Variable Mean SD
Information Technology 0.14 0.35
Electronics 0.13 0.34
Heavy Manufacturing 0.15 0.36
Banking and Finance 0.06 0.24
Services 0.14 0.34
Greenfield Site 0.63 0.48
Differentiation Strategy 4.12 0.73
Number of Employees (log) 5.63 1.43
Age (log) 2.84 0.83
Knowledge Inflow 3.43 0.99
Knowledge Outflow 2.33 0.96
State Efficiency 4.57 1.36
Labor Law Restrictiveness 35.46 15.73
% Union Members (subsidiary) 0.13 0.25
% HR Professionals (subsidiary) 0.02 0.07
% Expatriate Employees(subsidiary) 0.03 0.08
Power Distance 5.21 0.41
Performance Orientation 4.40 0.35
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Table 3
Correlation Matrix
Information Technology 1.00
Electronics -0.16 1.00
Heavy Manufacturing -0.17 -0.16 1.00
Banking and Finance -0.10 -0.10 -0.11 1.00
Services -0.16 -0.16 -0.17 -0.10 1.00
Greenfield Site 0.10 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.03 1.00
Knowledge Inflow 0.04 -0.03 -0.07 -0.05 -0.11 -0.03 1.00
Knowledge Outflow 0.12 0.08 -0.02 -0.04 -0.03 -0.02 0.22 1.00
Differentiation Strategy 0.16 -0.03 -0.04 -0.06 -0.10 -0.03 0.21 0.25 1.00
Number of Employees (log) 0.09 0.10 -0.06 0.09 -0.17 -0.08 0.20 0.18 0.22 1.00
Age (log) -0.06 -0.02 0.07 0.10 -0.16 0.09 0.00 0.02 0.05 0.24 1.00
Labor Law Restrictiveness 0.08 -0.11 -0.06 0.00 -0.02 -0.01 0.14 0.01 -0.01 0.15 0.03 1.00
State Efficiency -0.04 0.11 0.13 -0.05 -0.03 0.07 -0.14 -0.12 0.01 -0.12 0.02 -0.60 1.00
% HR Professionals (subsidiary) 0.09 -0.03 -0.01 -0.07 0.06 0.05 0.08 -0.16 -0.04 -0.47 -0.10 0.02 0.06 1.00
% Union Members (subsidiary) -0.10 0.04 0.03 0.01 -0.13 -0.30 0.16 0.04 -0.03 0.26 0.15 0.07 -0.10 -0.13 1.00
% Expatriate Employees(subsidiary) -0.03 0.04 0.05 0.18 -0.07 -0.02 -0.05 0.00 -0.02 -0.18 -0.02 -0.04 0.05 0.14 -0.08 1.00
Power Distance 0.01 -0.03 0.08 0.05 -0.01 0.08 -0.04 -0.08 -0.16 0.15 -0.10 0.30 -0.24 -0.13 -0.12 0.02 1.00
Performance Orientation -0.02 0.10 0.02 -0.12 -0.09 -0.08 -0.09 0.00 0.06 -0.23 -0.08 -0.48 0.67 0.12 -0.03 0.08 -0.41 1.00
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Table 4
Cluster Medians and Chi-Square Statistics for Rank-and-File Workers
Cluster
HPWS Practices RF-A(n = 26)
RF-B
(n= 125)
RF-C
(n = 63)
Chi-
Square
Training and Development:
b1) Extensive Training Resources 4 4 5 65.15a
2) Emphasis on Interpersonal Skill Training 3 4 5 128.77a
3) Extensive Orientations 3 4 5 56.35a
4) Skill Training Emphasized Relative to General 
Training (r) 1 2 2 41.22a
5) Extensive Use of Job Rotation 2 3 4 75.87a
6) Training Viewed as Short Term Cost (r) 3 4 4 112.21a
7) Extensive Cross-Functional Training 3 3 3 53.08a
 
Staffing:  
8) Emphasis on Internal Promotion 3 3 4 48.08a
9) Extensive Use of Career Planning 2 4 4 102.08a
10) Employees Use Multiple Skills 3 4 4 63.58a
11) Seniority Important in Promotions (r) 3 4 4 45.36a
12) Rigorous Selection Process 3 4 4 76.09a
13) Employees Hired Based on Current Skills 
rather than Potential (r) 2 3 3 75.63a
 
Compensation:  
14) Goal Achievement Emphasized in Appraisals 3 4 5 106.85a
15) Large Pay Differentials between High and 
Low Performers 3 3 4 58.61a
16) Emphasis on Performance-based Pay 3 4 5 87.47a
17) Seniority Important in Pay Decisions (r) 3 4 4 55.24a
18) Extensive Financial Participation (Incentives, 
Gain-sharing, etc.) 3 2 4 73.24a
 
Workplace Empowerment:  
Employees Use Extensive Initiative and 
Judgment 3 4 4 62.66a
Extensive Use of Teams 1 4 4 101.15a
Organizational Performance Data Shared with 
Employees 3 4 5 118.47a
Average of Cluster Medians 2.71 3.57 4.10
aSignificant  at  the .01 level  in cross-tabulation of  HR policy or  practice  with cluster  assignment  (after 
elimination of outlier cases).
(r) Items have been reverse coded for cluster analysis.
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Table 5
Cluster Medians and Chi-Square Statistics for Managerial Employees
Cluster 
HPWS Practices M-A(n = 115)
M-B
(n = 91) Chi-Square
Training Development:
1) Extensive Training Resources 4 5 67.45a
2) Emphasis on Interpersonal Skill Training 4 5 54.75a
3) Extensive Orientations 4 5 31.16a
4) Skill Training Emphasized Relative to General 
Training (r) 2 2 21.88a
5) Extensive Use of Job Rotation 3 4 35.62a
6) Training Viewed as Short Term Cost (r) 4 4 56.07a
7) Extensive Cross-Functional Training 3 3 32.16a
Staffing:
8) Emphasis on Internal Promotion 3 4 36.52a
9) Extensive Use of Career Planning 4 5 68.77a
10) Employees Use Multiple Skills 4 5 50.35a
11) Seniority Important in Promotions (r) 4 4 42.56a
12) Rigorous Selection Process 4 4 18.75a
13) Employees Hired Based on Current Skills 
rather than Potential (r) 3 4 32.68a
Compensation:
14) Goal Achievement Emphasized in Appraisals 4 5 59.75a
15) Large Pay Differentials between High and 
Low Performers 4 4 38.20a
16) Emphasis on Performance-based Pay 4 5 54.40a
17) Seniority Important in Pay Decisions (r) 4 4 43.53a
18) Extensive Financial Participation (Incentives, 
Gain-sharing, etc.) 3 4 53.92a
Average of Cluster Medians 3.61 4.22
aSignificant  at  the .01 level  in cross-tabulation of  HR policy or  practice  with cluster  assignment  (after 
elimination of outlier cases).
(r) Items have been reverse coded for cluster analysis.
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Table 6
Relative Frequencies of Cluster Membership within 
Host Countries for Rank-and-File Workers
Cluster
Host Country RF-A RF-B RF-C
China 0.0% 58.8% 41.2%
Germany 28.6% 28.6% 42.9%
India 12.5% 50.0% 37.5%
Italy 62.5% 0.0% 37.5%
Japan 0.0% 90.9% 9.1%
Kenya 6.3% 68.8% 25.0%
Korea 5.1% 71.8% 23.1%
Romania 0.0% 44.4% 55.6%
Russia 0.0% 80.0% 20.0%
Singapore 0.0% 79.2% 20.8%
South Africa 0.0% 62.5% 37.5%
Taiwan 7.7% 50.0% 42.3%
Thailand 64.7% 5.9% 29.4%
Vietnam 9.1% 90.9% 0.0%
TOTAL 12.15% 58.4% 29.4%
Chi-Square
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Table 7
Relative Frequencies of Cluster Membership within 
Host Countries for Rank-and-File Workers
Host Country M-A M-B
China 56.3% 43.8%
Germany 42.9% 57.1%
India 53.3% 46.7%
Italy 0.0% 100.0%
Japan 63.6% 36.4%
Kenya 73.3% 26.7%
Korea 65.0% 35.0%
Romania 33.3% 66.7%
Russia 40.0% 60.0%
Singapore 70.8% 29.2%
South Africa 25.0% 75.0%
Taiwan 53.9% 46.2%
Thailand 14.3% 85.7%
Vietnam 100.0% 0.0%
TOTAL 55.8% 44.2%
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Table 8
Results of Ordered Logit Analysis
Rank-and-File 
Workers Managers
Variable _B_ z-value _B_ z-value
Information Technology 0.09 0.21 -0.67 -1.26
Electronics -0.43 -0.92 -0.89 -1.60
Heavy Manufacturing 0.17 0.38 -0.14 -0.29
Banking and Finance -0.51 -0.79 0.17 0.20
Services -0.48 -1.00 -1.42 -2.28b
Greenfield Site -0.06 -0.19 -0.29 -0.78
Knowledge Inflow -0.25 -1.60c 0.07 0.41
Knowledge Outflow 0.18 1.15 -0.03 -0.17
Differentiation Strategy 0.49 3.02a 0.45 2.24b
Number of Employees (log) 0.05 2.64a 0.06 2.49a
Age (log) -0.03 -0.21 0.38 1.96b
Labor Law Restrictiveness -0.18 -0.97 -0.02 -0.10
State Efficiency -0.68 -3.00a 0.13 0.52
% HR Professionals (subsidiary) 203.37 2.36a 58.76 0.62
% Union Members (subsidiary) -0.26 -1.68c -0.33 -1.72c
% Expatriate Employees(subsidiary) 0.13 0.94 -0.04 -0.25
Power Distance -0.06 -0.41 0.03 0.19
Performance Orientation 1.88 3.12a -1.95 -2.82a
N 214 206
Chi-Square(18) 48.47a 55.20a
Pseudo R2 .12 .19
ap<.01   
bp<.05   
cp<.10   
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